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I. INTRODUCTION

The Reporter has reluctantly conceded that risk assessment may
properly divert those who commit less serious crimes from prison to lesser
punishments, and may properly increase the duration of imprisonment for
some of the most serious offenders. The source of this reluctance is the
single most daunting impediment to meaningful sentencing improvement:
our wholesale surrender to undifferentiated just deserts as mainstream
sentencing’s only responsibility. That surrender explains our demonstrably
dysfunctional, cruel, and wasteful allocation of the bulk of corrections
resources—jail and prison included. Our use of jail and prison under the
* Michael Marcus has been an Oregon trial judge since 1990. He has promoted legislation,
judicial conference resolutions, and sentencing protocols to encourage evidence-based sentencing in
pursuit of crime reduction. He is a member of the American Law Institute Members Consultative
Group on revision of the Model Penal Code sentencing provisions, and of local, state, and national
committees pursuing improved sentencing outcomes. He maintains a website at
http://www.smartsentencing.com.
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resulting paradigm frequently does more harm than good. The harm
consists of accelerated recidivism by offenders whose criminality would be
better addressed with wiser sentencing choices, of victimizations that
smarter sentencing would have avoided, of excessive punishments that
serve neither society nor the offender, of an enormous waste of public
resources, and of continuing corrosion of public trust and confidence.
Just deserts has legitimate social functions, but the role it plays in
mainstream sentencing theory and practice betrays both those functions and
public safety by allowing criminal justice actors to avoid accountability for
any outcome. By serving as an unmeasured talisman of sentencing,
typically displacing any responsible pursuit of utilitarian functions such as
crime reduction, just deserts has enabled our persistent failure to seek, let
alone to achieve, satisfactory crime reduction. Further, just deserts
currently drives the bulk of sentencing as an empty slogan that subverts our
ability to achieve its legitimate social functions: obviating vigilantism and
private retribution; promoting pro-social values such as respect for the
property, persons, and rights of others; serving the legitimate needs of
crime victims; and promoting respect for legitimate authority (“public trust
and confidence”).1
In Part II of this Article, I argue that the Reporter’s reluctance to
endorse risk assessment is the result of profound thinking errors, and
sanctions a status quo far more vulnerable to his concerns than is
responsible risk assessment. In Part III, I argue that by anchoring guidelines
to ordered just deserts rather than the pursuit of social purposes, the
Reporter weakens guidelines even for pursuit of the modest objectives of
reducing sentencing disparity and prison growth. In Part IV, I focus on the
Reporter’s misguided discomfort with the role of static factors, and argue
that such factors are properly considered in sentencing when assessing
offender responsivity. In Part V, I argue that the legitimate social purposes
obscured behind “just deserts” are usually served by sentencing that
responsibly pursues public safety, and discuss how sentencing should
1. See, e.g., Michael H. Marcus, Responding to the Model Penal Code Sentencing
Revisions: Tips for Early Adopters and Power Users, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 134 (2007)
[hereinafter Early Adopters and Power Users] (advocating that sentencing should promote public
safety and public values); Michael Marcus, Limiting Retributivism: Revisions to Model Penal Code
Sentencing Provisions, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) [hereinafter Limiting Retributivism]
(advocating that sentencing focus primarily on crime reduction); Michael Marcus, Justitia’s
Bandage: Blind Sentencing, 1 INT’L J. PUNISHMENT & SENT. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Justitia’s
Bandage] (advocating responsible pursuit of crime reduction); Michael Marcus, Comments on the
Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 135, 324 (2003)
(advocating that the first objective of sentencing be crime reduction); Michael Marcus, Comments
on Preliminary Draft #6 (Apr. 19, 2008), available at http://www.smartsentencing.info/CommOn
6thPD.pdf [hereinafter Comments on Preliminary Draft #6] (arguing in favor of the use of risk
assessment); see generally Michael Marcus, Smart Sentencing: Sentencing for Public Safety and
Harm Reduction, http://www.smartsentencing.com (last visited June 29, 2009) [hereinafter Smart
Sentencing] (discussing “sentencing for public safety and harm reduction.”).
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address any conflicts between those purposes and crime-reduction
objectives.
II. THE REPORTER’S RELUCTANT TOLERANCE OF RISK ASSESSMENT
The Reporter’s slow progress toward acceptance of risk and needs
assessment2 is positive change. He is surely correct that we must be
vigilant in pursuing validation of such instruments, as both continue to
improve and neither is likely to reach perfection. I agree with the Reporter
that research and funding ought to be encouraged, and that risk and needs
assessment must not trump proportionality.
The pain with which the Reporter struggles to accept a limited role for
risk assessment is palpable. He expresses his lament for “any human being”
when “false positives . . . result in . . . extended incarceration . . . imposed for crimes
[offenders] will never commit.”3 He overcomes that concern only by
conceding that forgoing reasonably accurate risk assessment “knowingly
permits victimizations in the community” that represent “human
suffering,” that “is both terrible and, in statistical terms, ineluctable” and
“that could have been avoided.”4 The Reporter explains his resolution of
this tension:
In short, we can avoid the unneeded incarceration of those
incorrectly identified as dangerous offenders (whom we
cannot separate in advance from the truly dangerous) only by
accepting the cost of serious victimizations of innocent parties
(whom we cannot identify in advance). There is no wholly
acceptable alternative in either direction—indeed, both
options approach the intolerable. The proper allocation of
risk, as between convicted offenders and potential crime
victims, is a policy question as difficult as any faced by
criminal law in a civilized society.5
Allocating risk and needs assessment only to the fringes of
sentencing—diverting lower risk offenders from prison and increasing
2. This Article addresses the iteration of risk assessment in MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING § 6B.09, at 62–72 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). The progression of the Reporter’s
position on risk assessment is reflected in comparison with the many previous drafts of the MPC
revision. Earlier drafts are listed in Michael Marcus, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 1, at 295
n.2. The debate regarding risk assessment has continued at least since 2003. Michael Marcus,
Comments on Preliminary Draft No. 1, supra note 1, at 142, 146–47. From the outset, the Reporter
was particularly suspicious of attempts to allocate prison sentences based on notions of risk
management, which he dubbed “selective incapacitation,” while he embraced “retributive theory” as
susceptible to “a proportional ordering of the severity of sanctions.” Kevin Reitz, Model Penal
Code: Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 552, 556 (2002).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmts. 64–65 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 65.
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prison terms for the highest risk offenders—is the result of profound
thinking errors. Those thinking errors yield mainstream sentencing entirely
to just deserts and result in the allocation of the bulk of prison and other
resources through means wholly divorced from risk and need, and
accountable for no social function. By avoiding the difficult choice
required for harm reduction, the Reporter has relegated the bulk of
sentencing to the worst of both worlds: brutality to victims whose crimes
should have been prevented, and brutality to offenders punished only in the
name of proportional severity with no benefit to anyone. His solution
hardly reduces the suffering of victims of crimes that more rational
sentencing would have prevented, or the suffering of offenders imprisoned
under his paradigm of proportional severity. Their suffering, after all, is not
diminished by altering its rationale.
A. Thinking Error #1: When Assessing the Accuracy of Risk
Assessment, Future Crimes an Offender does not Commit are not
“False Positives”; A Sentence Informed by Risk Assessment is not
“Punishment for Future Crime”
The first thinking error about risk assessment is succumbing to
skeptics’ misguided assertions that risk assessment ensures “false
positives” and amounts to punishment for crimes the offender has not yet
committed.
The notion that a “false positive” arises when a high-risk offender does
not commit a future crime is woefully off target. It undoubtedly emanates
from understandable and laudable bias against incarceration as a
deprivation of liberty—the same source that labels using prison for public
safety as “preventive detention.”
Assume, for example, identical serious assaults by offenders whose
criminal histories are also identical. Assume further that by analyzing
additional variables, a validated risk assessment instrument accurately
identifies one of the offenders as presenting a 1% risk of violent
recidivism, and the other as presenting a 30% risk of violent recidivism.
That only three of ten such identical higher risk offenders will, in fact,
commit a new violent crime within the contemplated period does not yield
seven “false positives.” The assessment of risk is by definition (in this
hypothetical) precisely accurate. Of course, this disparity in risk ought to
inform the choice whether to use scarce custody resources on the higher
risk offender, while using community-based supervision and appropriately
vetted programs on the lower risk offender. Assuming our purpose includes
public safety, this much should be obvious to any rational person.
Considering real disparity in risk does not mean that we are “punishing
offenders for future crimes,” but rather that we are managing the risk these
offenders represent by fashioning a sentence in response to a present
conviction for a past crime. An offender’s dangerousness is not dispelled
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by the circumstance that—whether or not because of our intervention—he
does not reoffend, any more than a landmine is only dangerous if it
explodes. Dangerous offenders incarcerated because of that danger will not
victimize others outside their prison during that incarceration. That they
may not offend when they get out does not mean they were incorrectly
incarcerated as dangerous—regardless of whether their avoidance of
recidivism was a matter of chance or successful rehabilitation. As this
hypothetical illustrates, an offender can be thirty times more likely than
another to commit violent crime, yet well short of certain to do so.
As long as the underlying conviction is just and the resulting disposition
not unlawful, disproportionate, or disparate without good cause, there is no
unfairness in allocating correctional restraints to those at highest risk of
reoffending. Further, substantial variations in risk (as well as in
susceptibility to rehabilitation—“responsivity”) are good causes for
disparity in disposition. After all, allocating restraints is much more
rational, fair, and transparent than allocating custody based on a wholly
untested, undifferentiated façade of just deserts and far less brutal in its
consequences to victims and to offenders. Those skeptical of risk
assessment such as the Reporter inherently defend terms of incarceration
based upon crudely ordered just deserts. The argument against risk
assessment, after all, is not that we do a better job of protecting potential
victims and avoiding unnecessary imprisonment without risk assessment
than with it. The argument instead ultimately reduces to the proposition
that we should not use prisons for public safety—regardless of the harm
that choice inflicts on victims and offenders. Thus, for example, the
Reporter’s sentencing revisions would not mention public safety as a
purpose. They would allow the pursuit of “utilitarian objectives” such as
crime reduction, through risk assessment or otherwise, only if that pursuit
achieves some validation beyond what the Reporter would require for
pursuit of retribution. He demands no validation whatever for requiring all
sentencing to achieve “severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of the offender.”6
The Reporter thus advocates distribution of the bulk of correctional
resources, including prison, based entirely upon just deserts with no
requirement of any demonstration that this distribution serves any purpose
at all. If we actually agree that the only legitimate purpose of prison is
punishment in this sense, we should at least allow offenders the option of
caning in lieu of incarceration.
The notion of a “false positive,” like “preventive detention” and
“punishment for a future crime” in this context7 is propaganda seeking to
6. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a)(i), at 8 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006); see
supra note 1.
7. I am addressing the use of “preventive detention” to describe using incarceration to serve
public safety, rather than its more proper use to describe incarceration of dangerous mentally ill
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disparage the use of prison for the one thing it is best at: protecting people
on the outside from people on the inside—while they are inside. Risk and
needs assessments should be as accurate as we can make them, but the
office of risk assessment is to assess risk, and the office of rational
sentencing is to manage that risk.
Perhaps this dedication to managing risk is why 89.3% of judges
responding to a recent poll commissioned by the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission agreed that risk assessment would be useful in sentencing all
crimes.8 Needs and risk assessment should be considered throughout the
realm of sentencing, not just at the fringes, and should inform both
individual sentences and policy decisions prescribing presumptive ranges
of sentences for categories of criminal behavior. I hope Oregon will
continue9 its exploration of incorporating risk assessment in its guidelines,
and will learn from Missouri, Virginia, Wisconsin, and other states
exploring the issue.10
There is substantial irony in the fact that risk assessment is
controversial within criminal justice only when invoked to guide
sentencing decisions. As almost noted by the Reporter,11 the use of risk
assessment in sentencing would be the one occasion on which counsel for
the offender and for the state could advocate and perform a quality
assurance role. There is little opportunity for such a role in the rapidly
expanding (and appropriate) use of risk and need assessment to guide
pretrial release decisions, probation conditions, prison programming, and
post-prison supervision.12
persons outside the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and
Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 317–19 (2006).
8. LESLIE TABLEMAN ET AL., OREGON CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION, SURVEY RESULTS
ANALYSIS REPORT ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND SENTENCING GUIDELINE PERCEPTIONS AMONG JUDGES
AND LAWYERS IN OREGON, app. A (2008).
9. Senate Bill 191 directed the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission to study “whether it is
possible to incorporate consideration of reducing criminal conduct” into Oregon’s sentencing
guidelines. 2005 Or. Laws 474. The Commission offered a bill in 2007 that would have begun to
incorporate risk assessment, but the bill did not survive the legislative process. See S.B. 276, 74th
Legis. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007). The Commission is continuing the exploration; the poll cited
in the text, supra, is one manifestation.
10. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. CRIMINAL SENTENCING
COMM’N, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-STAGE EVALUATION: PROCESS OF
SENTENCING REFORM EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DIVERSION & RECIDIVISM BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1-8
(2002), http://www.vcsc.state.va.us/risk_off_rpt.pdf; MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY
COMMISSION, RECOMMENDED SENTENCING: BIENNIAL REPORT 2007, at 31, 40 (2007),
http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file/MOSAC%20Commission%20Report%202007%20Final.pdf;
MISSOURI SENTENCING ADVISORY COMMISSION, RECOMMENDED SENTENCING: REPORT AND
IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE 4–5 (2005), http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file/final%20report21June%202
005.pdf; Wisconsin Court System, Assess, Inform and Measure (AIM) Pilot Project,
http://www.wicourts.gov/about/organization/programs/altaim.htm (last visited June 18, 2009.
11. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 63 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008) (referring to the
“protections of the courtroom”).
12. As to sentencing “enhancement” based on risk assessment, although predicting United
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B. Thinking Error #2: Sentencing Informed by Risk and Need
Assessment is not Competing with Sentencing that is Accurate, Free of
False Positives, Fair, Responsibly in Pursuit of Public Purposes, Kind
to Offenders or to Victims, or Rational
The second thinking error of risk assessment opponents is the
assumption that considering risk assessment would somehow undermine
the fairness or effectiveness of sentencing. In fact, sentencing unguided by
risk assessment is profoundly more unfair and ineffective—by any
responsible measure—than sentencing properly cognizant of risk and need.
The Reporter continues to stress that assessment must be used with
great caution, although he is increasingly cognizant of the growing
conclusion that it is far more reliable than “clinical judgments.”13 That
cognizance is consistent with abundant recent research about modern
instruments. But the Reporter invokes no such caution regarding
mainstream sentencing. He is willing to entrust the vast expanse of
sentencing between the lowest and highest levels of crime to clinical
judgment, albeit bounded by guidelines. That vast expanse is where we
presently send most offenders to prison, spend most of our money for
corrections, compete with such social purposes as higher education,14 and
do terrible harm. As the Reporter seems to acknowledge, mainstream
sentencing is “notoriously imperfect.”15 “[W]hole categories of inmates”
are probably “confined without adequate policy justification.”16 The
Reporter nowhere explains why we should be sensitive to the loss of
liberty, and to the terrible suffering of avoidable victimizations, only at the
fringes of sentencing occasions.
To whatever extent some may consider typical sentencing guidelines to
function as risk assessment, Oregon’s exploration of the issue yielded
research to the effect that, for the population most at issue (those released
from prison), under its guidelines, Oregon over-incarcerates about onethird of its population, under-incarcerates one-third, and gets it right
roughly one time out of three.17 Apart from the oppression inflicted on
States Supreme Court decisions carries some risk of error, the Blakely—Apprendi line surely means
that when a finding of risk is necessary to increase the sentence above that otherwise available (as
with some dangerous offender schemes), a jury trial right attaches. When risk assessment merely
informs but does not control discretion within a range already available as a result of a conviction
(by plea, or trial subject to a jury trial right), there is no additional jury trial right. The jury trial right
should be applauded, not assailed; it surely imposes no risk of unfairness or of error that does not
exist without that jury trial right.
13. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING§ 6B.09 cmts., at 62–65 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
14. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, ONE IN 100:
BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 4, 14–15, 31–32 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteron
thestates.org/uploadedFiles/One%20in%20100.pdf [hereinafter PEW CENTER: ONE IN 100].
15. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmts., at 62 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
16. Id. at 14 n.39.
17. These were the findings of a Department of Corrections researcher working with the
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offenders imprisoned without social benefit, using prison imprecisely on
low- and medium-risk offenders is demonstrably likely to increase the
recidivism of many of them,18 leading to victimizations that a more precise
allocation of prison would have avoided.
The Reporter’s de facto refuge is ordered just deserts (i.e., guidelineslimited retributivism) whose supposed relative precision is held up against
the risk of error in risk assessment. He makes no argument that guidelines
precisely pursue public safety. Instead, the Reporter tasks sentencing with
punishment in pursuit of “severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses,
the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of the
offender.”19
The Reporter’s designation of severity as the purpose of all sentencing
explains distributing prison beds “adequately to punish” offenders in order
to meet the expectations of “responsible officials” and the public.20 Public
expectations have a legitimate role in sentencing, but conspicuously absent
from the Reporter’s precision-based critique of risk assessment is any
attempt to specify the components of that legitimate role and to hold
sentencing accountable for serving them. It is additionally absurd to invoke
public expectations while rejecting public safety as the primary purpose of
prison, as the public wants public safety above all as the product of
criminal justice.21
Senate Bill 919 work group studying whether guidelines might be adjusted to serve public safety.
Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 76.
18. See OR. DEP’T OF CORR., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMUNITY-BASED SANCTIONS IN
REDUCING RECIDIVISM 2, 18, 22, 25, tbl. 3 (2002) (reporting results of Oregon study and review of
national literature), available at http://egov.oregon.gov/DOC/TRANS/CC/docs/pdf/effectiveness_
of_sanctions_version2.pdf; PAULA SMITH ET AL., CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STUDIES, UNIV. OF NEW
BRUNSWICK, THE EFFECTS OF PRISON SENTENCES AND INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS ON RECIDIVISM:
GENERAL EFFECTS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, 2002–01, at ii, 4–5 (2002), available at
http://www.dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection/JS42-103-2002E.doc; LIN SONG & ROXANNE
LIEB, RECIDIVISM: THE EFFECT OF INCARCERATION AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED 1 (1993), available
at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/IncarcRecid.pdf; Todd R. Clear, Backfire: When Incarceration
Increases Crime, OKLA. CRIM. JUST. RES. CONSORTIUM J., 1996, at 1, 2; Tomislav V. Kovandzic et
al., When Prisoners Get Out: The Impact of Prison Releases on Homicide Rates, 1975–1999, 15
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 212, 213–14 (2004); James Bonta, Solicitor Gen. of Can., The Effects of
Punishment on Recidivism, 7 RES. SUMMARY 3, 1–2 (2002), available at http://www.publicsafety.g
c.ca/res/cor/sum/cprs200205_1-eng.aspx (reporting meta analysis of 111 studies).
19. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §1.02(2)(a)(i), at 8 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006).
Punishment in pursuit of severity is hardly precise. See text accompanying notes 35–39, infra.
20. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 9 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2004).
21. See, e.g., BELDEN, RUSSONELLO & STEWART, OPTIMISM, PESSIMISM, AND JAILHOUSE
REDEMPTION: AMERICAN ATTITUDES ON CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND OVER-INCARCERATION 3 (2001);
JUDITH GREENE & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CUTTING
CORRECTLY: NEW PRISON POLICIES FOR TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 4–8 (2002), available at
http://www.cjcj.org/files/cut_cor.pdf; PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCS., INC., OPEN SOC’Y INST.,
CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1
(2002), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/usprograms/focus/justice/articles_publications/
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If any given range of punishment within guidelines is per se
“accurately” measured by just deserts, why the caution about informing the
concurrent discretion (within that range) with less than perfect assessment
instruments?22 “There are compelling reasons for an attitude of caution”23
for all uses of prison, not just when pursuing public safety. Yet the only
caution the Reporter offers outside utilitarian objectives is the unpacked
and unguided ordering of just deserts subject to appellate review for
aggravation and mitigation.24
There are finite purposes to be served by sentencing—either utilitarian
or public values. The means of pursuing utilitarian purposes include
specific25 and general deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. In
essence, this set of tactics pursues public safety through crime reduction.
For this analysis, I categorize the remaining objectives of sentencing as the
pursuit of public values. These include obviating vigilantism and private
retribution; promoting pro-social values such as respect for the property,
persons, and rights of others; serving the legitimate needs of crime victims;
and promoting respect for legitimate authority (“public trust and
confidence”).26 It is irresponsible for any policymaker or sentencing judge
publications/hartpoll_20020201/Hart-Poll.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L INST. OF CORR.,
PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY USING EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS WITH OFFENDERS § 1, at 4–16 (2000),
available at http://www.nicic.org/Downloads/PDF/2000/016296.pdf (citing Brandon K. Applegate
et al., Public Support for Correctional Treatment: The Continuing Appeal of the Rehabilitative
Ideal, 77 PRISON J. 237, 237–58 (1997)).
When it examined the issue of public opinion through empirical means in the United Kingdom,
the Halliday Report found that when respondents were asked unprompted what the purpose of
sentencing should be, the most common response was that it should aim to stop re-offending,
reduce crime or create a safer community. The next most frequently mentioned are deterrence and
rehabilitation. Very few spontaneously refer to punishment or incapacitation. JOHN HALLIDAY ET
AL., MAKING PUNISHMENTS WORK: REPORT OF A REVIEW OF THE SENTENCING FRAMEWORK FOR
ENGLAND AND WALES 8 (2001), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/312280/;
see also PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L FOR THE NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE
NCSC SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 20 (2006), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_RESEARCH/Documents/NCSC_SentencingSurvey_Report_Final
060720.pdf.
22. Class and minority disparity are good reasons to avoid unbounded discretion, but it
cannot be logically argued that a given range of discretion is made more susceptible to improper
disparity by including consideration of imperfect assessment tools, assuming the tools themselves
do not exacerbate discrimination.
23. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmts., at 64 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
24. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 72–75.
25. The Reporter continues his silence as to the role of specific deterrence.
26. See Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 88–95.
Proportionality restraints, the classic function of denunciation of prohibited conduct, and more
recent notions of restorative justice, are derivative of one or more of the listed purposes, and means
to their ends. Id. I recognize that these concepts often overlap—for example, a punishment that
must be severe to retain public trust and confidence will typically serve public safety through
extended incapacitation. And, it may be argued that pursuing public values achieves crime reduction
and to that extent is itself “utilitarian.” See infra note 44 and accompanying text. But the
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merely to assume that any sentence serves any purpose. It is irresponsible
merely to assume that any purpose justifies a departure from the lawful and
proportional sentence best aimed at public safety through careful attention
to risk and need. There is no persuasive basis for exempting any sentencing
tactic from the same construct that requires validation for risk and need
assessment. This is particularly so when public trust and confidence are so
dependent upon our impact on public safety.27
The Reporter’s lengthy, but diffusive, sojourn through the purposes
provision of the revision leaves his conclusions about those purposes
somewhat blurred. His original and persuasive critique of the existing
Model Penal Code sentencing (MPCS) provisions was that by providing an
unprioritized laundry list of potentially conflicting purposes, the provisions
give no meaningful direction at all.28 But he has now settled on a purposes
provision that stubbornly rejects public safety29 as a pervasive purpose of
sentencing in favor of an essentially retributive goal for mainstream
sentencing—proportional severity.30 This proportional severity affords
distinctions in the text are significant for analytical purposes in establishing that there is no
sufficient excuse to be careless in pursuing one purpose simply because another can be invoked.
27. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
28. Reitz, Plan for Revision, supra note 2, at 71; Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power
Users, supra note 1, at 68.
29. Id. at 72–73.
30. The Purposes provision of the revision, now set in place by the vote of those present at
the 2007 annual meeting of the American Law Institute, sets the stage for this analysis:
§ 1.02(2). Purposes; Principles of Construction.
(2) The general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all
official actors in the sentencing system, are:
(a) in decisions affecting the sentencing of individual offenders:
(i) to render sentences in all cases within a range of
severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the
harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness
of offenders;
(ii) when reasonably feasible, to achieve offender
rehabilitation, general deterrence, incapacitation of
dangerous offenders, restoration of crime victims and
communities, and reintegration of offenders into the
law-abiding community, provided these goals are
pursued within the boundaries of proportionality in
subsection (a)(i); and
(iii) to render sentences no more severe than necessary to
achieve the applicable purposes in subsections (a)(i)
and (a)(ii) . . . .
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imprecise direction, requiring the Reporter to expend enormous effort
promoting a sentencing scheme that relies on guidelines rather than
purposes to pursue consistency. The Reporter has certainly conceded the
imprecision of desert-based sentencing,31 and his vision of guidelines is
obviously designed to provide the guidance that the sentencing purposes he
embraces are themselves insufficient to provide.
The Reporter’s recent critique of parole release authority again reveals
that his acceptance of just deserts avoids precision instead of pursuing it.
The Reporter disparages the “disappointing” performance of parole
boards.32 Noticeably absent from his critique, however, is any discussion of
exactly what it is about parole release that has been unsatisfactory. Surely
the most persistent criticism (whether or not earned) has been that parole
boards were not adequately serving public safety because the people they
released committed new crimes.33 However, by the same metric, judicial
sentencing decisions—with or without guidelines—fully merit the same
disappointment. If we measure our performance by the subsequent criminal
behavior of those we have sentenced, judges are in no position to contend
that they compare favorably with the performance of parole boards.34 For
judges, there are only two ways to escape scrutiny for these outcomes: to
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), at 1–2 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2007).
31. For example, the Reporter explained his need to constrain deserts in part with this
analysis of Norval Morris:
The distinctive claim of Norval Morris’s theory is that moral intuitions about
doing justice in specific cases are almost always “rough and approximate”—
and that most people experience them as such. Even if a decisionmaker is well
acquainted with all the circumstances of a particular crime, and has depth of
knowledge about the offender, it is seldom possible (except in an extreme case)
for her to say that the deserved penalty is exactly x. In Morris’s phrase, the
“moral calipers” possessed by human beings are not sufficiently fine-tuned to
reach such judgments. He postulates instead that most people’s moral
sensibilities, for most crimes, will orient them toward a rough ballpark of
permissible sanctions that are “not undeserved.” Some imagined punishments
will appear clearly excessive to do justice, and some will appear clearly too
lenient—but there will almost always be room between the two extremes.
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 15 & n.22 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002).
32. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Study 2 (Council Draft No. 2,
2008) (citing Kenneth Culp Davis); id. at 52 (claiming “more than a century of demonstrated
failure”); id. at 60 (noting “a resounding failure”).
33. See, e.g., George Allen, The Courage of Our Convictions: The Abolition of Parole Will
Save Lives and Money, 72 POL’Y REV. 4, 4–7 (1995), available at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/
policyreview/3566617.html.
34. See, e.g., Michael Marcus, Justitia’s Bandage, supra note 1, at 2–4 (2005). Although
many departments of corrections include only felony convictions in recidivism measures, when
misdemeanors—which constitute upwards of 75% of crimes—are included, the recidivism rate of
those we sentence is in the neighborhood of 62% to 75% for most crimes. Id.
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blame recidivism on the supervision or correctional authority down the line
from our sentencing choices, or to invoke, as might parole board critics,
“appropriate severity” as adequate sentencing performance instead of the
accomplishment of any social goals. But if we truly measure our
performance by the same standard as those who assail the performance of
parole authorities, we are not demonstrably superior just because we are
better placed to conceal our responsibilities for public safety.
Ultimately, the Reporter assails risk assessment as imprecise and unfair,
and parole as disappointing, but he refrains from competing with either on
the same terms on which he assails them. The Reporter clearly does not
suggest that his paradigm—desert ordered by guidelines and appellate
review—offers a better device for achieving public safety than sentencing
guided by risk and need assessment or as defined by “back end” release
authorities. Instead, he joins forces with the critics of parole who
(correctly) assailed indeterminate sentences as lacking “transparency,” and
voices his
preference for visible, regulated, and accountable forums for
the exercise of sentencing discretion. [Parole abolition] also
reflects a policy judgment that, ordinarily, actual durations of
prison terms should be determined by courts at the time of
sentencing, subject only to marginal adjustments based on an
inmate’s behavior while institutionalized.35
But, this begs the question: by what measure are we to hold sentencing
“accountable”? Again, the Reporter does not suggest holding guidelines
accountable for achieving any affirmative social purpose, but only for
constraining administrative flaws he perceives in sentencing without
them.36 Guidelines per se arguably serve interests in reducing disparity and
regulating prison resources. However, they do so with great imprecision
and unreliability; they treat the psychopath and the drunk as identical when
in the same grid block,37 and they are frequently overcome by draconian
ballot measures and legislation imposing mandatory minimums, increasing
presumptive sentences, or otherwise raising the floor of sentencing.38 And,
35. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Study 2 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008).
36. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 72–83.
37. Id. at 77.
38. 1989 Or. Laws 1, §§ 2, 3 and 1989 Or. Laws 790, § 82 enacted contemporaneously with
Oregon’s sentencing guidelines, required previous mandatory “gun” minimum sentences to trump
guideline sentences, and required “determinate” sentences without reduction, leave, or parole for
certain felonies if committed by offenders with similar prior convictions (“Denny Smith”
sentences). In 1995, Oregon voters adopted mandatory minimum sentences for a similar range of
serious felonies (“Ballot Measure 11”). 1995 Or. Laws 2, 421. In 1996, effective July, 1997,
Oregon legislated thirteen and nineteen month presumptive sentences (to override lower
presumptive sentences in the guidelines) for certain “repeat property offenders.” OR. REV. STAT.
§ 137.717 (2007); 1996 Or. Laws 3, § 1. And, in Oregon’s 2008 general election (and
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since proportionality in the sense purportedly served by guidelines is both
opaque39 and maintained primarily by ignoring differences that matter
among offenders and offenses,40 even proportionality is accomplished with
appalling imprecision. As to all of their purported functions—achieving
proportionality, restraining disparity, and preserving prison resources—
guidelines per se impose constraints, but they pursue no significant
affirmative social purpose.
Until and unless guidelines are responsibly aimed at public safety (via
risk and needs assessment and concomitant evidence-based sentencing) or
at other social purposes properly included in “just deserts,” they surely
raise no bar against which to compare the validity of risk and needs
assessment.
To aim guidelines at the social purposes properly included within “just
deserts,” those purposes must be identified, and the causal links between
sentence and purpose must be held at least to the “realistic prospect of
success” test to which the Reporter would hold “utilitarian or restorative”
purposes of sentencing.41
III. THE INADEQUACY OF EVEN ORDERED JUST DESERTS AS A
SENTENCING LODESTAR
The Reporter’s pervasive embrace of retributivism is based on its
propensity for “a proportional ordering of the severity of sanctions,” due to
supposed advances in retributive theory.42 The proportional ordering under
the Reporter’s paradigm is to be accomplished by sentencing commissions
promulgating guidelines that prescribe relatively narrow ranges of
sentences based on sentencing purposes—most pervasively “the gravity of
offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of
offenders.”43
The most prestigious argument that just deserts lends itself to ordering
is the body of work contending that imposing the sentence the public
notwithstanding steadily declining related crime rates), voters adopted yet another provision
designed to require judges to impose more and longer prison sentences than guidelines otherwise
prescribe on various nonviolent offenders. “Ballot Measure 57” was approved by the voters on
November 4, 2008. S.B. 1087, 74th Legis. Assem., Spec. Sess. (Or. 2008), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/08ss1/measpdf/sb1000.dir/sb1087.b.pdf.
39. See Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1327–34 (2006).
40. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 77 & n.31.
41. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.03(3), at 68 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006); see
generally Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 67. “Realistic
prospect of success” is now formulated as “when reasonably feasible” in § 1.102(2). MODEL PENAL
CODE: SENTENCING § 1.102(2) (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002).
42. Reitz, Plan for Revision, supra note 2, at 20–21; see also supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
43. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
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accepts as “just” has a series of consequences for public safety, such as
achieving public confidence in the courts and their role in promoting law
and values and encouraging citizens to accept and act in accordance with
those laws and values.44 While I agree that just deserts can and should
serve public purposes,45 this clamor towards condoning undifferentiated
just deserts is fatally flawed.
First, most people pay no attention to criminal justice unless they are
victims of crime, they (or a close family member or associate) are accused
of crime, or they get bombarded during election season by proponents and
opponents of crime-related ballot measures or candidates who choose the
crime card as a campaign platform. The notion that mainstream sentencing
below the radar of mass media has any generalized impact on public
lawfulness is fanciful for this reason alone.
Second, the evidence precludes any empirical conclusion that
punishment can serve public safety by ignoring public safety as a measure
of sentencing. In the meager attempts by these legal philosophers to enlist
the support of science in their campaign for retributivism, they celebrate
research findings that people seem to agree on the ordinal ranking of crime
seriousness yet disagree about what punishment is “just” for a given
crime.46 But general agreement that rape should be punished more severely
than theft and theft more severely than jaywalking hardly demonstrates the
likelihood of raising public trust and confidence simply because sentencing
guidelines distribute punishments without offending mere ordinal ranking.
Public outrage at leniency in the sentencing of the perpetrator of a heinous
crime is not assuaged by a consensus that more serious crimes are punished
more harshly than less serious crimes. For example, the public outrage at
sending a first-time juvenile shoplifter to prison for five years would not be
assuaged by news that a more serious theft would result in seven years and
jaywalking would yield a fine.
To the extent the public pays any attention to sentencing, it is far more
likely to react to sentences perceived as too severe or too lenient long
before it recognizes any ordinal ranking—particularly if we evidence no
purpose other than severity. Further, the ordinal rank of such an excessive
or inadequate sentence is hardly likely to solve the public relations
problem.
44. This is a synopsis of views most prominently and persistently expressed by Professor Paul
Robinson. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE
PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 135–212, 247–60 (2008); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of
Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 149–55 (2008);
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and
Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471–78 (1997); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the
Criminal Law Care What the Lay Person Thinks is Just? Coercive vs. Normative Crime Control, 86
VA. L. REV. 1839, 1866–69 (2000).
45. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 88–91, 93–95.
46. Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1831–33 & n.6 (2007).
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Third, and most importantly, the overwhelming evidence is that the
public is concerned, most of all, with how successfully we prevent
recidivism.47 It is preposterous to posit public satisfaction sufficient to
reduce criminal behavior through a sentencing system that not only
eschews responsibility for public safety but is demonstrably ineffective at
achieving it.48
To be fair, the Reporter does not rely on the retributivists’ contention
that meeting the public’s notion of fair punishment will itself serve the
utilitarian function of crime reduction. Rather, from the beginning, he has
sought quietly to steer sentencing away from public safety in order to
combat excessive use of prison,49 to reduce disparity, to increase
“transparency of the sentencing and corrections system and its
accountability to the public, and to enhance the legitimacy of its operations
as perceived by all affected communities.”50
Even by these standards, sentencing guidelines that fail to incorporate
responsible efforts to achieve public safety across the entire range of
sentencing are demonstrably inadequate to respond to prison growth or
disparity.51 Basing a sentencing structure on retributivism, however
“limited,” inherently promotes the notion that the purpose of sentencing is
to exact retribution, as well as the fallacy that severity is the measure of
crime control effectiveness and of just deserts.52 Such a system can never
compete with those that appeal (or pander) to public fears of crime for two
related reasons. First, since the public will always assume public safety is a
purpose of sentencing,53 however valiantly some academics strive to
distract us from that purpose, our persistently poor performance in
reducing recidivism will always appear (correctly, at least in part) to be the
fault of sentencing. As long as we accept undifferentiated just deserts as
sufficient sentencing performance, the public easily will be misled to
conclude that our poor public safety results will be cured by increased
mandatory minimum sentences.
Second, since our present use of just deserts effectively reduces or
eliminates any responsible attention to public safety on the part of those
47. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Michael Marcus, Justitia’s Bandage, supra note 1, at 2–4 (2005).
49. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 74–76; see also
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 21 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(j), at 5–6 (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2002).
51. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 68–78; see also
Michael Marcus, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 1, at 329–30 & n.107.
52. See generally Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1293–95 (2006) (arguing that the principle of desert as a limiting principle
should be treated with more skepticism); Edward Rubin, Just Say No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 17, 17–19 (2003); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
85, 85–89 (2003).
53. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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who impose sentences and the advocates who might inform sentencing, it
allows us to claim success without even addressing public safety in
imposing sentences. We inevitably then do a far worse job of preventing
future criminal behavior by those we sentence than we would were we to
make a responsible attempt to achieve the best public safety outcome.
Because the result is avoidable crime, we are fueling the arguments that
produce more severe sentences,54 which, in turn, increasingly burdens
those minorities already disparately burdened by incarcerationism and
thereby exacerbate the most corrosive form of disparity.
In short, avoiding responsibility for public safety and constructing
guidelines that direct attention away from the impact of sentencing on
social well-being inherently fails to reduce prison growth and its disparate
impact on minorities.
IV. THE STATIC FACTOR ISSUE AND DISPARATE IMPACTS
In the lexicon of risk and needs assessment, “criminogenic” factors are
those circumstances or characteristics of an offender that sufficiently
correlate with criminal conduct to allow an assessment of the risk that an
offender presents of criminal behavior.55 Among these are “static” factors
that we cannot change. Some are matters of birth and genetics, such as
age,56 gender, and ethnicity. Other factors such as criminal history, age at
first entry into the criminal (or juvenile) justice system, or childhood
circumstances are unchangeable only because they were accumulated in the
past. 57 “Dynamic” factors are those that are prospectively changeable.58
Most significant among the dynamic factors are those designated as
“criminogenic needs” because they identify concomitants of criminal
behavior that correctional or other interventions can alter in the hopes of
reducing future criminal behavior.59 The criminogenic factors list typically
includes criminal history and childhood abuse (static), antisocial values
(“criminal thinking”), pro-criminal associates, substance abuse,
unemployment and educational deficits (dynamic).60
54. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 69.
55. The propositions in this paragraph are common knowledge to probation and corrections
departments steeped in “evidence based practices,” but relatively new to the culture of sentencing.
A concise history and description of risk and need assessment, and the related “responsivity
principle,” is JAMES BONTA & D.A. ANDREWS, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL FOR OFFENDER
ASSESSMENT AND REHABILITATION 2007–06 (Canada 2007), available at http://www.publicsafety.
gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/Risk_Need_2007–06_e.pdf.
56. Age changes, but we have no control over it (putting aside capital punishment). It is
treated as a static factor for these purposes, but its impact on risk is generally that most criminal
behavior “ages out” as offenders get older. Exceptions include some species of sex offenders and
many offenders with personality disorders.
57. BONTA & ANDREWS, RISK-NEED-RESPONSIVITY MODEL FOR OFFENDER ASSESSMENT AND
REHABILITATION 2007–06, supra note 55, at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 4–5.
60. For example, risk (and needs) assessment instruments vary considerably in their inclusion
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Some of the resistance to risk assessment takes the form of protestation
that it is “unfair” to consider static factors over which an offender has no
control in determining a sentence. The Reporter voices objection primarily
to static factors related to protected classes:
Judge Marcus’s software incorporates an offender’s gender
and race as correlates of post-sentence recidivism. The
consideration of race is disapproved in Tentative Draft No. 1,
§ 6B.06(2)(a) (2007), and is almost certainly unconstitutional,
while consideration of gender for the narrow purpose of risk
and needs assessments is expressly permitted by the revised
Code, id. § 6B.06(4)(b).61
There are two reasons for allowing consideration of ethnicity. First, to
the extent that discrimination has exaggerated the criminal history of some
offenders, it is both fair and even arguably constitutionally required (and in
any event responsible and hardly racist) to analyze them separately from
cohorts whose history was not so exaggerated. The result may well be that
an offender seems appropriate for a less severe sentence when compared
with others subject to similar improper exaggeration, instead of as part of a
cohort composed of many whose criminal history is the same without
exaggeration. In other words, failing to separate the data may compound
and exacerbate the impact of past racial bias in the administration of
criminal justice.
Second, crucial to any rational approach to crime is that after we assess
an offender’s risk and criminogenic needs, we respond in a manner likely
to produce the intended result in light of the offender’s “responsivity”:
“learning style, personality, motivation, and bio-social (e.g., gender or
race) characteristics.”62 Many programs, some custodial, are designed to
target specific minorities. Without separating cohorts based on this kind of
data, we may well lose opportunities for more effective and less punitive
dispositions that are particularly useful because they more effectively
or weighing of such factors, and the field is quickly generating new instruments and revisions of
former versions that are thought to be best for various classes of offenders. What works well on
general populations of offenders may not work as well on sex offenders, recidivist drunk drivers,
domestic violence offenders, or juveniles. Instruments also vary as to what type of criminal behavior
they predict. For example, some are designed to predict violence and some domestic violence in
particular.
61. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Note 70 (Council Draft No. 2, 2008). The
“software” reference is to sentencing support tools we have developed to display outcomes
measured by recidivism for similar offenders sentenced for similar crimes. Those tools do not
purport to be risk assessment instruments. See Michael Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of
Denunciation: Criminal Justice’s Weakest Link, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 671, 673, 678 (2004); see
generally Michael Marcus, Smart Sentencing, supra note 1 (discussing the flaws in the existing
sentencing approach).
62. BONTA & ANDREWS, supra note 55, at 1, 5–7.
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address criminogenic circumstances, learning styles, or life experiences
commonly bundled in the groups they target.63 We certainly know that
some modalities of treatment work best if designed for such minorities.
Medicine is full of examples of diagnostic and treatment protocols that
reflect the varying prevalence of disease and disorder among patients by
gender and ethnicity; effective public health measures often require
adjustment of tactics to cope with minority cultures.64
To insist that we forgo the beneficial potential of the facility to separate
data as described is to insist, in many applications, that we exacerbate
racism and unnecessarily forgo opportunities to avoid harm. It is hardly
constitutionally compelled.
Skeptics of risk assessment—many of the same voices that deem it
“preventive detention” or “punishment for future crime”—condemn any
reference to static factors whether or not related to protected classes.65 The
divide over static factors, similar to the Reporter’s qualms about risk
assessment in general, reflects the dysfunctional impact of the archaic reign
of just deserts. If the purpose of sentencing is punishment in the sense of
imposing pain in some moral proportion to the heinousness of the
offender’s violation of social norms—if it actually makes sense to define
the goal of sentencing by concepts of aggravation and mitigation—then of
course it is wrong to use many66 static factors to “aggravate” a sentence by
increasing its severity. It is also appropriate, however, under a just deserts
paradigm, to use sympathetic static factors—such as childhood misfortune,
youth, or mental disability—to “mitigate” a sentence by reducing its
severity. Given the prevalence of references to aggravation and mitigation
in sentencing schemes, many unsurprisingly shy away from consideration
of circumstances over which an offender has no control when arguing for
the harsher end of an available sentence.
At a recent conference,67 a judge in the audience asked whether the
63. Fortunate communities commonly have programs for: domestic violence victims who are
mothers of infants or young children; at-risk Hispanic, Asian, or African American youth, or those
attracted to gangs; gay teenagers; American Indians with alcoholism; and some sexual minorities
such as transsexuals. Our sentencing support tools do not yet have access to all the data necessary to
track all of these variables.
64. The ability to separate cohorts also permits us to detect improper disparity in sentencing,
which probably explains much of the opposition to that ability; concealing racism is often the
agenda of “color-blindness.”
65. See, e.g., LORETTA CAPEHEART & DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, SOCIAL JUSTICE 53–55 (Rutgers
University Press, 2007); David Rose, Locked up to make us feel better, NEWSTATESMAN (Mar. 19,
2007), available at http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2007/03/risk-prison-sex-act-life; Paul H.
Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001).
66. For purposes of this analysis, it does not matter whether we carve out past criminal history
from those (static) factors legitimately considered in just desert sentencing, on the theory that
accumulating the criminal history was the product of blameworthy past choices.
67. Wisconsin AIM Site Visit Conference, Effective Justice Strategies Subcomm., Wis. Court
Sys. (Nov. 20, 2008).
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Virginia risk assessment application, while counting youth as a factor
enhancing risk, considered the brain development of adolescents. The
presenter explained that the literature supported the notion that in general,
younger offenders are at a higher risk of reoffending than older offenders,
all other variables being equal.68 The questioner was obviously
unimpressed. It is, after all, entirely consistent with the dominant
sentencing culture that when attempting to influence a judge’s sentencing
discretion, a prosecutor will emphasize what it is about the offender, his
history, or the latest crime that should anger us at the offender, while the
defense attorney will mine youth per se, childhood hardship, social or
mental dysfunction, or addiction to invoke sympathy to influence
sentencing discretion in favor of the offender.
Rational sentencing demands that we confront this contradiction. If the
purpose of sentencing is public safety, many of the attributes that might
make us feel sorry for an offender also suggest that the offender represents
a higher risk than another offender who is similar but does not possess
those attributes. In other words, the dominant sentencing culture is
backwards from a public safety standpoint—the more dysfunctional an
offender’s childhood or intractable his addiction, the more likely the
offender represents a risk to society. But recognizing relevant differences is
also critical to discovering and vetting dispositions that reduce the criminal
behavior of disparate cohorts. Youth may indicate increased risk, but may
also increase responsivity to interventions that reduce that risk.
Just as we should consider gender, ethnicity, age, and disability when
relevant to diagnosis and treatment in medicine, we should do so in
sentencing when the result is a more effective disposition measured by
reduced criminal behavior. For example, it is absurd to invoke “equal
treatment” to insist that we imprison all repeat property offenders for
thirty-six months, just because public safety may demand that sentence for
the highest-risk offenders among them, when differences such as age and
gender make alternate sanctions far more likely to be successful in terms of
crime reduction for many members of the cohort. We are not treating like
offenders alike if we insist on ignoring factors that make them quite
unalike in risk and responsivity to treatment. Although we can and should
insist that we do not use such distinctions further to disfavor a protected
class, these factors otherwise may legitimately militate in favor of
incapacitation at higher risk levels. This may help explain why many
academics, refugees from last century’s rehabilitation era, and defense
attorneys want to avoid acknowledging public safety as the purpose of
prison.
This tactic of avoidance, however, has been disastrous as a means of
restraining overuse of prison. When research revealed that treatment was
not actually delivering public safety, abandonment of the medical model
68. Id.
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ushered in the explosive growth of imprisonment rates that makes the
United States ironically the world leader both in freedom and
incarceration.69 The guidelines movement has proved incapable of
reversing that growth. As long as we continue to insist on the adequacy of
retributive analysis to distribute prison beds, we will continue to generate
avoidable victimizations that drive the demand for the only solution our
misdirection teaches the public to seek: increased incarceration.
The only way out of this addictive relationship with retribution70 is to
recognize the public’s right to demand that criminal justice in general, and
prosecutors and judges in particular, be accountable for our impact on
public safety.71 When we accept that accountability, demonstrate
competence at smarter sentencing, and produce some success at reducing
recidivism by wisely allocating the entire realm of correctional resources,
we will at least have standing to explain to the public the tragic error of our
present paradigm. We would have standing to explain that measured by
public safety, what works best varies with the offender—the offender’s risk
and needs—and the availability of dispositions that will reduce or restrain
that risk, and that unwarranted severity and mindless use of prison often
threatens, rather than protects, public safety.
In fact, prison is the rational and appropriate choice for some offenders,
while it is wasteful, counterproductive, and not infrequently brutally cruel
for others. We can hope to produce roughly a 30% reduction in recidivism
among many common offenders if we demand that the programs to which
we send them are properly designed and administered, and appropriate for
each offender’s criminogenic needs.72 We can demonstrate that many of
69. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 68; PEW CENTER:
ONE IN 100, supra note 14, at 5.
70. Cyclical budget restraints mitigate prison growth, and guidelines may slow it. However, a
way “out” is one that has potential to reverse it. Other methods that typically mitigate but do not
reverse prison growth include manipulation of probation and post-prison supervision revocation
standards, term-reduction schemes such as “alternative incarceration” and some reintegration
schemes that shift prisoners into transitional placements. The relationship is addictive because
retributive policy increasingly imprisons offenders whose criminality is increased by their
imprisonment. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The increased criminality fuels increased
pressure to increase imprisonment. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. As with most
addictions, increased consumption simply drives increased consumption and reduced satisfaction.
71. I speak as a judge, because judges make sentencing choices that inherently have an impact
on public safety whether or not we intend or attempt to produce that impact. I include prosecutors
because their plea bargaining policies and behaviors drive an enormous proportion of sentencing.
Defense counsel have other obligations, of course, but their fealty to their clients requires that they
be competent to recognize and exploit circumstances that render public safety concerns supportive
of the outcome clients desire. See Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1,
at 113–18, 120–26.
72. See, e.g., STEVE AOS ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC
POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS, AND CRIME
RATES OLYMPIA 16 (2006), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-10-1201.pdf; Roger
K. Warren, Evidence-Based Practices and State Sentencing Policy: Ten Policy Initiatives to Reduce
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the lower-risk offenders swept into custody by our increasingly draconian
approach to sentencing will ultimately produce more victimizations than
would occur had we instead employed appropriate community-based
dispositions.73 And we can realistically entertain the hope that the public
will respond to the need to fund effective programs—many of which are
far more cost-effective than prison for many common cohorts of
offenders74—when we begin to behave as if we believe sentencing is about
public safety and that good programs can actually work on many offenders
in and out of custody.
We do not behave as if we believe sentencing is about public safety if
we maintain that evidence-based practices are only appropriate for lowerlevel crimes, or even if we accept the role of risk assessment at the highest
and lower levels. This notion that most sentencing purposes are fully
satisfied by proportional severity for the bulk of the criminal justice
population—those beyond our comfort with the lessons of the evidence—
is unfortunately popular with many self-proclaimed sentencing reformers.
They shrink from recognizing the efficacy of incapacitation to reduce crime
and therefore prefer “limiting” retributive theory to science for allocating
prison terms among those who must be imprisoned.75 This notion is
ineffective because it has failed to reverse prison growth,
counterproductive because it spawns avoidable victimizations that fuel
increasingly draconian sentencing laws, and pernicious because it enables
the public fallacy that increasing severity is the best answer to crime—a
fallacy that retributivists are all too eager to exploit.
Surrendering mainstream sentencing to just deserts has obviously not
assisted in achieving particularly humane limits on sentencing, and it has
failed to achieve the sort of public and policy support necessary to obtain
sufficient resources for effective treatment and programming. Instead, this
surrender has profoundly sabotaged the credibility of evidence-based
sentencing among the general public by supporting the charges of bias in
favor of leniency. “Evidence-based practices” is a formulation that surfaces
almost exclusively in arguments for treatment and alternative sanctions,
but rarely appears to follow the evidence when it points to incapacitation.
That apparent bias also deters acceptance of risk assessment and evidencebased practices among potential allies of reformers who genuinely seek
Recidivism, 82 IND. L.J. 1307, 1308–09 (2007).
73. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
74. See AOS ET AL., supra note 72, at 9–11 & ex. 4.
75. The Reporter’s opening announcement for the Model Penal Code sentencing revision
relied substantially on the work of prominent academics who disparaged the use of prison as a
crime-reduction tactic, deeming this strategy for deploying prison “selective incarceration.” Kevin
Reitz, Plan for Revision, supra note 2, at 552–57, and authorities cited. See also Michael Marcus,
Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 68–70. That the criminal justice system has been
grossly inept in allocating prison resources to serve public safety does not mean that we should not
use prisons for public safety—just that we must get much better at doing so, which necessarily
implicates risk and needs assessment.
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public safety rather than retributive justice.
None of this means that proportionality has no role. Moral restraints
properly provide limits on the dispositions we should impose on a given
offender or for categories of behavior and circumstances. Absent a
sufficiently blameworthy criminal act, we have no business using the
criminal justice system to force a minor offender into six months of
custodial treatment merely because it is most likely to reduce his future
criminal behavior—any more than we should convict someone accused of
drunk driving because we would like to see him in treatment.
In fact, the public is way ahead of us on this issue, and far more
supportive of rehabilitation than policymakers.76 Public support for
rehabilitation and public safety represents a potential resource which our
addiction to retributivism has so far precluded us from exploiting. When
we accept responsibility for public safety and acknowledge that
incapacitation is the appropriate means to that end for some offenders, we
will be far more likely to achieve meaningful sentencing reform—
measured by reduced harm both to potential victims and to sentenced
offenders. But we cannot make any progress as long as we allow judges,
attorneys, and policymakers to invoke “just deserts,” a “just punishment,”
or “a sentence that fits the crime” as an adequate performance measure.
Instead, we must identify the legitimate components of desert and the
public value purposes lurking within its curtilage, and then require that
those purposes compete with best practices to achieve reduction in criminal
behavior only when and to the extent demonstrably necessary.
V. HOW TO CIVILIZE JUST DESERTS
Just as we were able to recover from the “nothing works” era with
responsible attention to data about what does or does not work on which
offenders,77 we are fully capable of civilizing just deserts. Both efforts start
with the same realization: that proclaiming, deciding, and pretending that
we serve the public value purposes of sentencing is just as much magical
thinking as the same approach to serving the public safety purposes of
sentencing. Just as imprisonment does not produce penitence because we
had hoped that it would (and a jail sentence is rarely likely to make many
offenders think twice about their choices next time), attempting to fit the
punishment to the crime does not accomplish the public value purposes of
sentencing just because we wish that it would.
At least we have known all along that the public safety purposes of
76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. The era was inaugurated in 1974 by Robert Martinson, who soon recognized that he
overstated his case. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 68 & nn. 4–
5. That we were able to recover does not mean that we have recovered from the notion that nothing
works, or that we have become generally responsible in vetting programs. Id. Indeed, we generally
insist on assigning programs by symmetry with the offender’s charge rather than responsiveness to
his needs. Id. at 104 n.75.
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sentencing have to do with crime reduction, and the only quibble
connected to identifying these purposes has concerned to what extent,
whether, or when general deterrence competes with recidivism reduction as
the most realistic tactic to employ to the end of crime reduction.
Recidivism reduction and incapacitation are usually far more realistic
objectives than general deterrence, and general deterrence—to whatever
extent it is a viable expectation—depends far more on certainty and
celerity than on severity for its impact, and thus rarely assists in the
selection of a particular sentence in most cases.78
The legitimate public values purposes bundled behind “just deserts”
are, I submit, these:79 obviating vigilantism and private retribution;
promoting pro-social values, such as respect for the property, persons, and
rights of others; serving the legitimate needs of crime victims; and
promoting respect for legitimate authority (“public trust and
confidence”).80 Proportionality, denunciation, and restorative justice are
among the means by which we seek to promote pro-social values.
It is, of course, true that quantifying the impact of sentencing on these
components of public values is more challenging than merely detecting the
recidivism of those we sentence. But this is no excuse for using a slogan in
their stead, let alone for forgoing measurement of our performance in its
name. After all, the Reporter would have sentencing commissions base
their promulgation of desert-ordering guidelines on research concerning the
extent to which sentences serve their purposes, which in his paradigm
includes “appropriate severity.”81 The Reporter’s nod toward research is
insufficient. First, while encouraging research, he imposes no requirement
that the service of any purpose related to “appropriate severity” be
plausibly promoted by sentencing, while forbidding the pursuit of any other
sentencing purpose absent a finding of reasonable feasibility.82 In other
words, he would have commissions survey society for notions of
78. See, e.g., Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 81–82 n.43,
and accompanying text; Michael Marcus, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 1, at 315 n.65.
“Celerity” is swiftness, apparently selected for its alliterative contribution to “certainty, celerity and
severity” in general deterrence lexicon. See, e.g., RONALD L. AKERS, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES 16–
33 (1999).
79. I believe that the text captures all legitimate purposes of sentencing that are not utilitarian,
but if there be more, the proposed analysis still demands that they, too, not compete with evidencebased purposes unless themselves evidence-based.
80. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 88–95.
81. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a), at 1 (Tentative Draft No.1,
2007) (sentencing purposes include proportionate severity), with MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 1.02(2)(b)(vii), at 2 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2007) (intending to encourage research on
effectiveness of sentences in achieving sentencing purposes), and MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6A.01(2)(d), at 46 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2007) (requiring commission to base promulgations on
research).
82. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2)(a), at 1 (Tentative Draft No.1, 2007); see
Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1.
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appropriate severity, but impose no requirement that any sentence serve
any purpose if imposed within promulgated limits of severity. Second, he
goes no further than “appropriate severity,” and utterly fails to
acknowledge, articulate, or respond to the notion that “appropriate
severity” is, along with other requirements in supposed furtherance of
public values, but a means to ends that need to be identified.83
Understandably, the result is that the Reporter does nothing to encourage,
much less assure, that sentences serve any such purposes.
Although the impact of sentencing on public values is more difficult to
assess than sentencing’s impact on recidivism, that assessment is hardly
beyond the scope of social questions we routinely research and rely on in
other fields. Many important human endeavors—including finance,
marketing, politics, public health, and insurance—heavily rely upon
analogous research to determine which means are most likely to produce
the desired result.84 Within the world of justice systems, the National
Center for State Courts supports court performance measures to assess the
level of public confidence in access to and the fairness of courts,85 and
researchers have produced substantial material about public attitudes
toward sentencing86 that would provide a firm basis for responsible inquiry
into how sentences do, or do not, meet or affect public expectations. This
sort of inquiry ought to be among the highest callings of sentencing
commissions, second only to pursuing best evidence of what works on
which offenders to reduce their future criminal behavior.87
Even before we have abundant resources that address how sentencing
choices cover each of the means by which we might serve public values,
there is much to be said for merely insisting on a rational articulation of
when, to what extent, and with what assurance any concern for public
values ought to influence a sentencing choice. In my experience, merely
focusing on the question of general deterrence causes most prosecutors to
disavow deterrence as a plausible outcome of any sentencing choice. “Send
a message” advocates often retreat when asked for their actual
understanding of how our sentencing actually impacts potential offenders
or public trust and confidence. Just having this discussion may strip away
nonsensical competitors for best outcomes when sentencing offenders
83. The Reporter’s promulgation of sentencing purposes confuses means with ends served by
those means. See Burt W. Griffin & Lewis R. Katz, Sentencing Consistency: Basic Principles
Instead of Numerical Grids: The Ohio Plan, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2002); Michael
Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 88–89.
84. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 1 (1996).
85. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COURTOOLS: A COURT PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK, 5
(2005), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/CourTools/CourToolsWhitePagesv4.pdf.
86. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
87. Michael Marcus, Early Adopters and Power Users, supra note 1, at 103, 133–36;
Michael Marcus, Limiting Retributivism, supra note 1, at 296.
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whose crimes are addiction driven with no actual victim. And, most
victims who appear to exercise their emerging rights to be heard at
sentencing actually focus their concerns on preventing future crimes, rather
than on extracting retribution. When a victim explains the need for a sense
of tangible justice because an identification theft crime has seriously
disrupted her life, and when a victim of violent crime or her spokesperson
conveys the impact of that crime on a life, a family, or a community, we
can actually make an effort to consider what available sentencing choices
might actually and properly respond. Victim input is an entirely legitimate
(but not necessarily determinative) source of information about what it
takes to promote the public values at stake at sentencing. Of course, that
input also helps us assess and address the victim’s own needs.
In the great majority of sentencing occasions, serving public values
does not compete with serving crime reduction through best efforts to
reduce recidivism. Even when there is some tension between those
objectives of sentencing, adjusting the means by which to pursue crime
reduction can usually accommodate public value purposes without
compromising public safety or imposing any more severe sentence than
that most likely to serve crime reduction. There are, of course, significant
exceptions. Negligent homicide cases involving non-recidivist drunk
drivers; some shaken baby tragedies involving youthful parental
desperation rather than systemic violence; and some intrafamilial sexual
child abuse cases often require a more severe sentence than crime
reduction purposes alone would require. On such occasions, the need for
tangible justice for survivors, the therapeutic needs of child victims who
might otherwise believe themselves responsible, the requirement that we
comport with public notions of right and wrong to maintain trust and
confidence, and meaningful response to the social values implicated call
for punishment beyond that sufficient to accomplish risk management and
the prevention of future criminal behavior. At the highest levels of crime,
and thus, usually, of risk, the length of incapacitation necessary for
adequate social protection is concomitantly appropriate for serving the
public values sentencing should serve.
What is critical, however, is that we must not continue to allow mere
unreasoned invocation of proportional severity, “just punishment,” or the
pretense of treating like alike to excuse us from careful sentencing choices.
Such excuses are the source of most sentencing dysfunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Reporter’s misgivings about risk assessment are ultimately
unfounded, but they help explain his choice of ordered but opaque just
deserts over public safety as the lodestar for mainstream sentencing. That
choice allows those who negotiate or impose sentences to avoid
accountability for achieving any social purpose. Sentencing so freed from
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accountability subverts public safety, betrays public trust and confidence,
brutalizes victims of avoidable crimes and offenders punished with no
benefit to society, and squanders public resources. Rational and
accountable sentencing occurs within the bounds of proportionality, but
within those bounds exercises best efforts to serve public safety and public
values. Best efforts require use of risk and needs assessment, and deliver
sentencing responses with due regard as well to the circumstances that
determine the offender’s responsivity. Best efforts focus on preventing
recidivism unless public values require some deviation from that focus.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/5

26

